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INTRODUCTION
Imagine if Christians had to carry on their body something they disagree
with religiously, like "Jesus is a lie," in order to engage in daily activities.'
This is exactly how some Atheists, Humanists, and one Jewish plaintiff felt
in Ohio, which led to their challenge against federal statutes that require the
inscription of the national motto, "In God We Trust," on U.S. currency.2 The
plaintiffs in New Doe Child # 1 v. Congress of the United States, contended
that the motto on the currency causes them to bear, affirm, and proselytize an
objectionable message in a way that violates their religious beliefs.3
In New Doe Child, which the Sixth Circuit decided in 2018, the court held
that the use of the United States' motto "In God We Trust" on U.S. currency
did not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).4 The
majority held that the plaintiffs did not satisfy RFRA's substantial burden test
because some of the plaintiffs could avoid cash transactions.5
The plaintiffs contended that the motto on the currency placed a substantial
burden on the exercise of their religion in three main ways: by causing
1. Jack Jenkins, How Atheists Are Turning 'Religious Freedom' Laws Against
Religion, THINK PROGRESS (May 19, 2015, 12:00 PM) (quoting Michael Newdow);
https://thinkprogress.org/how-atheists-are-turning-religious-freedom-laws-against-
religion-3ac6d8f668c0/ (noting that challenges to the nation's motto under the
Establishment Clause have failed but under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) of 1993, may not be susceptible to misapplication of constitutional principles).
2. See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2018)
(arguing that the placement of the motto on U.S. currency violates the Free Exercise and
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and RFRA).
3. See id. at 583 (arguing, for example, that the motto forces the Jewish plaintiff to
commit the sin of excessively printing God's name and destroying God's printed name).
4. See id. at 590 (finding that the plaintiffs had alternative forms of payment and
RFRA does not require the Government protect plaintiffs in the use of their preferred
means of payment); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (noting that RFRA's purpose
is to restore a compelling interest test as set forth by previous case law and to guarantee
its application where the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened).
5. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 5901 (noting that although several plaintiffs
run small businesses or are self-employed and frequently engage in cash transactions to
operate their business, they do not allege that they would suffer severe consequences by
choosing to not engage in cash transactions); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) (holding that to determine whether a substantial
burden on the exercise of religion is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest,
the court must look beyond broadly formulated interests and scrutinize the asserted harm
of granting specific exemptions to religious claimants).
2
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plaintiffs to (1) personally affirm a religious sentiment that is opposite of what
they consider to be religious fact; (2) affirm as true a statement that they
believe to be false (both that God exists and that they as Americans trust in
God) when their religious ideologies mandate that they act with honesty; and
(3) evangelize a religious belief that is entirely contrary to their personal
religious attitudes.6 The plaintiffs further contended that they were forced to
violate their beliefs every time they chose to engage in financial transactions
involving cash. Subsequently, the plaintiffs contended, they were
substantially burdened by having to choose between violating their beliefs to
engage in cash transactions or maintaining their beliefs but denying
themselves the opportunity to transact with certain businesses.8  The
government argued, and the Sixth Circuit held that, because the plaintiffs
could avoid cash-only transactions, they were not substantially burdened.9
This comment argues that the Sixth Circuit erred in its decision in New
Doe Child #1 v. Congress of the United States of America when it held that
the plaintiffs were not substantially burdened by using money on which the
nation's motto is inscribed.'0 Part II describes the theory behind the formation
of RFRA and how recent Supreme Court decisions have drifted away from
Congress's original intent in creating the act." Part II also describes the
history of the nation's motto on U.S. currency and the Court's inconsistency
6. See New Doe Child #], 891 F.3d at 583 (discussing the plaintiffs allegations that
carrying and transacting with cash bearing the national motto is often necessary to
participate in everyday commerce and forcing plaintiffs to make a choice to not use cash
or to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs is a substantial burden on the exercise
of their religion for which the Government does not put forth a compelling interest).
7. See id. at 590 (discussing the plaintiffs' allegation that transacting in cash forces
them to bear a religious message that is contrary to their personal religious opinions but
is often necessary to engage is certain transactions).
8. See id. at 591 (discussing the plaintiffs' allegations to find whether they have
established that they are substantially burdened as required under RFRA).
9. See id. at 590 (finding that the plaintiffs were able to conduct the bulk of their
purchases with credit cards and checks and holding that because plaintiffs did not allege
that they were forced to use cash, they could not be substantially burdened); see, e.g.,
Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996, 1008-09 (6th Cir. 2017)
(holding that the operator of a private religious school, which had agreed to lease church
property as the location for its school, had adequate alternative locations for its religious
mission and the burden of an additional 12.1 mile car ride each way was a "mere
inconvenience").
10. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 590 (holding that plaintiff's preferred form
of cash transactions when alternative forms of payment are available is a mere
inconvenience).
11. See infra Part II (discussing the reasons behind the formation of RFRA and how
subsequent cases have shifted its application).
2019]
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regarding whether the motto is secular.'2 Part II also discusses how the
Sherbert wo-part test under RFRA has been interpreted since 1993 and the
current lack of guidance for future RFRA claims.13 Part III asserts that the
nation's motto on U.S. currency is not the least restrictive means of furthering
a compelling governmental interest.14 Part IV recommends that courts should
lay a framework to assess when a burden becomes a substantial burden under
RFRA.15 Part V concludes by reiterating the need for a standard in
determining what constitutes a substantial burden under RFRA in order for
the statute to be applied fairly. 16 Part V further concludes by restating that
the nation's motto on U.S. currency is not narrowly tailored to further the
government's asserted compelling interest of proclaiming the fundamental
political values the motto represents, and therefore is not valid under
RFRA.17
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Formation of RFRA and Its Intended Purpose
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 was passed in response to
the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith.'8 In Smith,
the plaintiffs were terminated from their employment after ingesting peyote
for sacramental purposes at their Native American Church service and were
subsequently barred from collecting unemployment benefits due to the
manner of their discharge.19 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of
12. See infra Part II (discussing the recent history of the nation's motto on currency
and conflicting case law on whether the motto has lost its religious meaning).
13. See infra Part II (highlighting the differences in the courts' interpretations of
what constitutes a substantial burden and compelling governmental interest as defined
under RFRA).
14. See infra Part III (arguing that the Government's asserted interest is not achieved
with the least restrictive means as required under RFRA).
15. See infra Part IV (recommending that courts apply a uniform test in determining
what qualifies as a substantial burden for claims brought under RFRA).
16. See infra Part V (concluding that without clear boundaries for courts to apply in
determining substantial burdens under RFRA, they will continue to misapply RFRA
protections).
17. See infra Part V (concluding that placing the nation's motto on U.S. currency is
not the least restrictive means of publicly proclaiming the fundamental political values
the motto represents).
18. See generally Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the
claimants' Free Exercise rights were not violated because ingesting peyote was illegal
under laws of general applicability).
19. See id. at 882 (holding that to grant plaintiffs a religious exemption would create
4
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the First Amendment permitted the state of Oregon to criminalize religious
practices if they violated generally applicable laws.20 The decision in Smith
reversed the long standing holding in Sherbert v. Verner, which allowed
plaintiffs to be exempted from federal laws if the laws infringed upon their
free exercise rights." Congress' responded to Smith by creating RFRA,
which stated that governments should not substantially burden religious
exercise without compelling justification.22 The compelling interest test was
drawn from the Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner and specifically set
forth that if a person claims a sincere religious belief and a government action
placed a substantial burden on the exercise of that belief, the government
would then need to make a showing that a compelling state interest justified
the action and that it was being pursued in the least burdensome way.
23
In order to file a successful claim under RFRA, a plaintiff must show that
a government action is a substantial burden on the exercise of their religion.
24
The substantial burden test inquires as to whether the Government is forcing
plaintiffs to choose between engaging in conduct that violates their closely
held religious beliefs or refraining from that conduct in an effort to avoid
such a violation.
an extraordinary right to ignore generally applicable laws on the basis of religious belief).
20. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (finding that the Free Exercise Clause protects the
right of individuals to believe whatever they wish but does not necessarily protect the
right to act on those beliefs); See also U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the government
from making any law respecting an establishment of religion or taking action that unduly
favors one religion over another).
21. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that South Carolina's
law that a claimant who chooses not to work, although able to, is ineligible for
unemployment benefits was unconstitutional where an individual refused to work on
Saturdays due to religious beliefs); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234
(1972) (holding that Amish parents who violated Wisconsin's compulsory education law
adequately supported the claim that its enforcement would gravely endanger the free
exercise of their religion).
22. See Yoder, 407 U.S. at 220-21 (noting that the compelling interest test was
established by prior Federal court ruling).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (noting that the decision in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) essentially eliminated the requirement that the
government put forth a justification for burdens placed on religious practices even when
laws were neutral toward religion).
24. See id. (noting that laws meant to disrupt religious exercise and neutral to religion
may both burden religious practice).
25. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014) (finding
that the balancing test from Sherbert must be applied to determine whether a
governmental action imposes a substantial burden); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct.
853, 862 (2015) (holding that preventing an inmate from grooming his beard according
2019]
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Congress' enactment of RFRA allowed the federal government to bypass
the ruling in Smith and revert back to the free exercise exemption outlined in
Sherbert.2 6 However, in 1997, the Supreme Court held in City ofBoerne v.
Flores that RFRA could not be applied to states because Congress could not
determine the manner in which states could enforce restrictions under
RFRA. Although the Supreme Court found RFRA unconstitutional as
applied to the states, it is still in effect federally.2 8 Subsequently, many states
have developed their own RFRA laws.29
B. History of the Nation's Motto on Currency
The phrase, "In God We Trust," was first placed on the two- cent piece
coin in 1864 due to an increase in religious sentiment after the Civil War.30
Prior to the adoption of this phrase on U.S. currency, the first phrase inscribed
on American currency was "Mind Your Business."3 1 In 1955, Congress
mandated that "In God We Trust" be inscribed on all U.S. coins and bills and
eventually established the phrase as the national motto.
3 2
Many courts have held that brief religious references such as the words
"under God" or "in God we trust" are constitutional because such phrases
to his religion was a substantial burden).
26. See Sherbert, 8374 U.S. at 1794 (holding the law forced the plaintiff to follow
the precepts of her religion and forgo benefits or abandon one of the precepts to work).
27. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (holding that enforcing
RFRA against states is not a proper exercise of Congress' enforcement power because it
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers).
28. See id. at 522 (explaining that many states have enacted state RFRAs virtually
analogous to the federal RFRA and operating by the standard set forth in Sherbert and
Yoder).
29. National Conference of State Legislatures, STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RESTORATION ACTS, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-
statutes.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2019) (noting that since 1993 at least twenty-one states
have enacted a state version of RFRA).
30. See History of 'In God We Trust,' U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.
treasury.gov/about/education/Pages/in-god-we- trust.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2019)
(discussing the call from individuals urging the United States to recognize god on
currency).
31. See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 595 (6th Cir. 2018)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr.
Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770,
774) (arguing that the original motto on currency was a secular separation assuring
individuals that no one should feel alien to the government due to differing religion or
philosophy).
32. See id. (discussing the evolution of the national motto on U.S. currency).
6
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have lost their meaning over time and through repetitive use.33 In Van Orden
v. Perry, the Court held that a state action with religious undertones is
permissible if the action conveys a historic and social meaning rather than an
intrusive religious endorsement.3 4 Similarly, in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, Justice Brennan stated in his concurrence that the
national motto has been so entrenched into the country's traditions that it has
lost its specific religious meaning.35 In Aronow v. United States, the Ninth
Circuit held that statutes requiring the inscription "In God we Trust" on U.S.
currency had nothing to do with the establishment of religion.
36
Conversely, in Wooley v. Maynard, the court held that the state of New
Hampshire could not require Jehova's Witness plaintiffs to display the state
motto "live free or die" on their license plates when the plaintiffs Jehovah's
Witness plaintiffs who were required by New Hampshire law to bear the
state's motto, "live free or die," on their license plates obscured the motto as
they found it repugnant to their religious beliefs.37 In Wooley, the court held
that the state of New Hampshire could not require plaintiffs to display the
state motto on their license plates.38 Relatedly, in ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd., the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the
national motto does not have a completely secular purpose.39
33. See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 306
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Ohio state motto 'With God All Things Are Possible"
did not endorse a religious view because it was a symbol of common identity).
34. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 678 (2005) (holding that monuments
including a large stone depicting the Ten Commandments were typical of unbroken
history dating back to 1789 and although religious, also had historic meaning).
35. See School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp., 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the national motto is interwoven so deeply into
the fabric of society that it does not conflict with First Amendment protections).
36. See Aronow v. U.S., 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that the use of
the national motto is patriotic or ceremonial and is not government sponsorship of any
certain religion).
37. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706-07 (1977) (holding that the State had
a right to communicate an official view of history, state pride, and individualism but
could not force individuals to display a message conflicting with their religion).
38. See id. at 722.
39. See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289,
308 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[H]ad the test that the government must have exclusively secular
objectives much of the conduct and legislation this Court has approved in the past would
have been invalidated" (citing the Supreme Court decision in Lynch v. Donnely, 465
U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984)).
2019]
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C. The Court's Inconsistent Determination of What Constitutes a
Substantial Burden and Least Restrictive Means
The text and legislative history of RFRA offer minimal guidance on what
constitutes a substantial burden.40 In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court found
that the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial
burden when noncompliance with the contraceptives mandate required under
the Affordable Care Act would result in a fine of approximately 475 million
dollars per year on the craft store chain, which the court held constituted a
substantial burden.4' In Sherbert, the total amount of potential public benefits
Mrs. Sherbert was at risk of losing was not stated in the facts; however, the
Court still found that the burden was substantial.42 Similarly, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, the Court found a substantial burden existed where the plaintiffs were
faced with a fine of five dollars for noncompliance with a compulsory
education law.43
The issue of whether a substantial burden exists has been so undefined by
case law that some lawyers avoid discussing it altogether.44 In Zubik v.
Burwell, the plaintiffs argued that the Affordable Care Act's requirements
regarding contraceptives substantially burdened the exercise of their
religion.45 The Supreme Court declined to define whether there was a
substantial burden in Zubik and vacated the case to the Court of Appeals in a
per curiam decision.46 The Court's inability to define when a burden
40. Michael A. Helfand, The Substantial Burden Puzzle, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1
(2016) (quoting Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1175, 1213 (1996)) (discussing how the text and case law of RFRA has not
established a working definition or test for determining when a burden becomes
substantial).
41. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014)
(discussing the financial penalty for noncompliance with the contraceptive coverage).
42. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (noting that the welfare benefits
at risk for the plaintiff constituted a substantial burden on her exercise of religion).
43. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (recognizing the potential threat
compulsory public education past the eighth grade posed to the Amish way of life).
44. See Chad Flanders, Substantial Confusion About "Substantial Burdens," U. ILL.
L. REV. 27, 32 (2016) (discussing the oral argument in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557
(2016), and noting that Justice Kennedy asked the Solicitor General arguing the case
whether he conceded that there was a substantial burden based on his avoidance of the
issue in his oral argument).
45. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (noting that the Act requires
businesses to cover certain contraceptives in their health plans for employees or submit
a form to their insurer stating that they object due to religious beliefs).
46. See id. at 1561 (remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the
court's opinion).
8
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becomes substantial has led to conflict between appellate courts due to
unsuccessful application of the statute.4
Correspondingly, Federal appellate courts have disagreed on what it means
for the Government o act through the least restrictive means.48 For instance,
the Second Circuit concluded that the Government is not required to exhaust
every possible alternative but merely show that there are not significantly less
restrictive means.49  The Eighth Circuit has also been lenient to the
Government, holding that it would be an extraordinary burden to require the
Government to refute every conceivable alternative in order to satisfy the
least restrictive prong.50 In contrast, the Third Circuit has stated that the
Government must consider and reject other means before it can conclude that
its chosen policy is the least restrictive means.5' Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
has held that the Government must provide actual evidence demonstrating that
the regulatory framework in question is the least restrictive means of
furthering its interest.52 The Sixth Circuit also tends to impose a stricter
burden on the Government.53 Accordingly, in New Doe Child #1 v. Congress
of the United States of America, the Court neglected to analyze whether the
Government acted in the least restrictive means and instead ended their
analysis after a determination that the Government did not impose a
47. Jonathan Knapp, Making Snow in The Desert: Defining a Substantial Burden
Under RFRA, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 259, 263 (2009) (discussing how the interpretation of
the term "substantial burden" has caused confusion and tension in the Supreme Court's
free exercise decisions).
48. Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious
Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 63, 69 (2015)
(discussing how the Court's holding in Hobby Lobby created difficulty in determining
how the government should show that their means are least restrictive).
49. See Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 105 (2nd Cir. 2007) (discussing the
precedent and application of the court's holding in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, noting the
burden the government must show in a least restrictive means test under RFRA).
50. See Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1556 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that,
although RFRA places the burden of production and persuasion on the government, the
plaintiff must demonstrate what, if any, less restrictive means remain unexplored).
51. See Washington v. Klein, 497 F.3d 272, 284 (3rd Cir. 2007) (noting that the
"least restrictive means" is a relative term, implying a comparison with other means that
the Government must make as they carry the burden).
52. See McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 475-76 (5th Cir.
2014) (discussing that the existence of a government-sanctioned exception to a
regulatory scheme purported to be the least restrictive means can show that less
restrictive alternatives exist).
53. See U.S. v. Girod, 159 F. Supp. 3d 773, 783 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (holding that
requiring an Amish defendant to pose for a photograph prior to releasing him from
custody was not the least restrictive means of furthering the government's interest).
2019]
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substantial burden on the plaintiffs.
5 4
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Plaintiffs in New Doe Child Successfully Alleged a Substantial
Burden by the Government on Plaintiffs' Religious Exercise
In New Doe Child, The Sixth Circuit incorrectly held that, because the
plaintiffs have access to alternative forms of financial transactions besides
cash, they are not substantially burdened.55 Despite conceding that some
transactions are cash only, the court found that because the plaintiffs did not
allege that they must engage solely in cash-only transactions, but rather that
they simply prefer to use cash, they did not establish a substantial burden.
5 6
However, the mere fact that the plaintiffs had an alternative form of payment
at their disposal apart from using cash does not eliminate the fact that they
are substantially burdened when they do use cash, which our common
experience proves is necessary for certain transactions.
57
In New Doe Child, the court departed from the compelling interest analysis
and analogous case law by holding that the plaintiffs were not substantially
burdened as the vast majority of Americans do not take issue with the national
motto, viewing the motto as either secular or devoid of its meaning.58
Subsequently, because there is no defined standard for determining
substantial burdens, the court exercised their discretion and found that
because the plaintiffs hold a point of view different from the majority of
Americans, their purported burden of carrying currency with a message they
54. See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 591 (6th Cir. 2018)
(holding that a substantial burden was not imposed by the Government action and
concluding the RFRA analysis without determining whether the Government acted in the
least restrictive means).
55. See id. at 591 (holding that no substantial burden exists where plaintiffs had
alternative forms of engaging in financial transactions).
56. See id. at 590-91 (addressing some plaintiffs' allegations that they must engage
in cash transactions for business or for purchasing items such as books, magazines, treats,
and gifts).
57. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (noting that the court does not
consider available alternative means of practicing religion to determine if a burden is
substantial); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014)
(finding that RFRA requires courts to assess substantial burdens under the same lens as
RLUIPA using compelling-interest analysis).
58. See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289,
306-08 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the Ohio state motto 'With God All Things Are
Possible" had a secular goal to boost morale, was a symbol of common identity, and did
not enhance religion).
10
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disagree with did not meet the imaginary test to receive free speech
protections.5 9 Thus, while previous decisions have found that the presence
of alternatives are not determinative in finding whether a substantial burden
exists, the Sixth Circuit disregarded this concept due to their minority view
that the nation's motto does not violate the plaintiffs' religious beliefs.
60
The plaintiffs in New Doe Child #1 are substantially burdened because the
government action forces plaintiffs to choose between either relinquishing
their rights to participate in everyday commerce or violating their religious
beliefs.6' Credit cards do not provide an adequate substitute to cash forms of
payment because they have not replaced cash in many daily transactions.
62
Nearly 16 million American adults do not have a bank account and
approximately 24.5 million Americans are underbanked, meaning that they
rely heavily on services such as payday loans and cash advances.63 Even if a
plaintiff has access to alternative forms of payment, a court could logically
infer from common sense that the plaintiff may wish to engage in a cash-only
transaction.64  Despite access to noncash forms of currency, cash-only
transactions still play a daily role in American lives.65 Thus, just because
59. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (citing to the First
Amendment protections of free speech).
60. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. at 862 (holding that the district court erred in
finding that a prisoner's religious exercise was not substantially burdened by prohibiting
the inmate from growing a beard because he was offered a prayer rug, a religious advisor,
the required dietary items, and permitted to observe religious holidays).
61. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008)
(noting that a substantial burden is imposed only when individuals are forced to choose
between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit or
coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal
sanctions).
62. See Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(holding that although the blind plaintiffs developed coping mechanisms for dealing with
paper currency, such as relying on third parties or using credit cards, the alternative
means denied them meaningful access to currency).
63. See FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, https://
www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2015/2015report.pdf (discussing that the rate of
underbanked groups was higher for low-income, less-educated, young, and racial
minority households).
64. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (noting that when well-pleaded
facts are unavailable, the court is permitted to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense).
65. See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 600 (noting that
common sense shows that credit cards cannot substitute for cash because credit cards
cannot be used in all forms of transactions); see also Wendy Matheny et al., The State of
Cash: Preliminary Findings from the 2015 Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, FED.
RES. BANK OF SAN FRANCIsCO, (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.frbsf org/cash/files/Fed
2019]
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there are alternatives to cash does not demonstrate that a plaintiff is not
required to engage in cash and coin transactions on a regular basis and
therefore, the plaintiffs have shown an unsustainable choice between
violating their religious beliefs or being excluded from full participation of
economic life, establishing a substantial burden.
66
Assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs in New Doe Child #1 have not
established a substantial burden, plaintiffs who do use cash only will
successfully demonstrate a substantial burden if they view the national motto
as a contradiction to their sincerely held religious beliefs.67 Individuals of
lower socioeconomic status will be especially vulnerable to a substantial
burden if the national motto violates their religious beliefs as they face more
obstacles than individuals do from wealthier socioeconomic statuses to
gaining access to credit cards or electronic transactions.68
Thus, the Court erred in concluding that, because these specific plaintiffs
had an alternative to cash-only transactions and were not forced to engage in
a cash-only commerce, they were not substantially burdened.69 In New Doe
Child #1, the Court fell victim to the ill-defined standard for determining
when a burden becomes substantial and instead based its decision on its
Notes-The-State-of-Cash-Preliminary-Findings-2015-Diary-of-Consumer-Payment-
Choice.pdf (discussing how, even if there are other options available, cash is the most
common form of payment, especially in the categories of gifts and transfers, government
and nonprofit, auto and vehicle, entertainment and transportation, and medical and
education).
66. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (holding
that the owners of many closely held corporations could not in good conscience provide
contraceptive coverage and the HHS would effectively exclude these people from full
participation in the economic life of the Nation, which RFRA was enacted to prevent).
67. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 682 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that, at a
minimum, a substantial burden analyzed under a RFRA claim occurs when the
government compels a religious person to act in a manner at odds with basic elements of
his religion and when the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and violate his beliefs).
68. Christian E. Weller, Access Denied: Low-Income and Minority Families Face
More Credit Constraints and Higher Borrowing Costs, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS
(Aug. 2007), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/08/
pdf/credit access.pdf (noting that low-income families are denied access to credit more
than middle-income families and racial minorities, who are denied credit at a higher rate
than their white counterparts).
69. See Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 565 (6th Cir. 2014) (concluding that a
substantial burden existed for an inmate where he was permitted some, but not all, of the
food required for his religious ceremonies as the inmate was essentially barred from
engaging in his religious practice).
12
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perception of reasonableness for the plaintiffs' beliefs. 0 The Ninth Circuit
held that denying a person or institution the ability to follow his or her
religious beliefs without exception is a substantial burden."' Such is the case
in New Doe Child #1, as the plaintiffs cannot carry cash without violating the
tenets of their religion. The Court came to its holding through subjective
means and erred accordingly. 
7
1
B. The Nation's Motto on U.S. Currency Is a Violation of RFRA Because
the Motto Is Not in Furtherance of a Compelling Governmental Interest
The Government in New Doe Child #1 did not successfully establish that
disseminating the national motto on U.S. currency is a compelling
government interest.74 Under RFRA, the Government shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, unless the Government demonstrates that the
application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest.71 In New Doe Child #1, the Government defended the
inscription of the national motto on U.S. currency by arguing that it is critical
to the public declaration of the primary political values the motto
symbolizes. 6 The Government went on to claim that their interest is
compelling because the nation's motto on U.S. currency is a primary form of
70. See Lloyd H. Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens
and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U.L. REV. 1137, 1164 (2009) (noting that the Court
suggested a "substantial burden" is substantial pressure on adherents to modify behavior
and that the free exercise inquiry is whether government placed a substantial burden on
observation of a central religious belief or practice).
71. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that under RFRA a substantial burden is imposed if individuals must choose to
follow the tenets of their religion or to receive a governmental benefit not to).
72. See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 583 (discussing that
the national motto places a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious exercise by
forcing them to "personally bear a religious message that is the antithesis of what they
consider to be religious truth").
73. See Alex T. Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approachfor the Protection of Native
American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 297 (2012) (discussing that in
determining when a burden becomes substantial under RFRA, the application of the
substantiality test requires a subjective weighing to be sensitive to different contexts).
74. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 591 (concluding the analysis after
determining that plaintiffs did not establish a substantial burden).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (1993) (elucidating that the government should
not substantially burden religious exercise without a compelling justification).
76. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 601 (Moore, J., dissenting) (discussing the
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communicating the country's fundamental values to the citizens of the United
States and to the rest of the world. However, the Government did not
provide evidence to support why or how the role of the motto on U.S.
currency is disseminated to Americans and to the rest of the world or why it
is a compelling governmental interest to do so.78 The lack of support the
Government provided to explain how using the nation's motto on currency
proclaims the country's fundamental political values is likely due to the fact
that the most compelling evidence is the prevalence of cash in daily
transactions.7' However, noting the pervasiveness of cash in the American
system belies the Government's argument that foregoing cash transactions is
not a substantial burden for the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs can easily use
alternative forms of payment.80
The Sixth Circuit failed to realize that by making this assertion, the
Government was essentially supporting the Plaintiffs' argument that carrying
U.S. currency inscribed with the nation's motto is forced speech that violates
the free exercise of their religion.8' Where the state's interest in compelling
speech is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such
interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message.8 2 As the court held in Wooley, a state
may not constitutionally require a person to engage in the dissemination of
77. See id. (noting the government's vague support for their compelling
governmental interest).
78. See id. (noting that any evidence the Government purports would bely their
argument that plaintiffs have alternative means of engaging in commerce that does not
involve cash or coins).
79. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (finding that New
Hampshire's placement of the motto "Live Free or Die" on license plates to communicate
to others an official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and
individualism cannot outweigh an individual's right to avoid becoming a courier for such
a message).
80. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 601 (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the
lack of support the Government provides in their argument is likely due to the
contradiction it would demonstrate for their argument and that the Government is
essentially attempting to "have its cake and eat it too").
81. See id. (reasoning that the government likely gave little evidentiary support for
its argument that the national motto communicates a message with the country and world
because it would undercut its argument that plaintiffs were not forced to communicate a
message contrary to their beliefs).
82. See EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 283 F. Supp. 3d 629, 629
(W.D. Ky. 2017) (holding that the Kentucky Ultrasound Informed Consent Act, which
required physicians to perform an ultrasound prior to an abortion procedure, display and
describe the images, and auscultate the fetal heartbeat, was analogous to the forced
speech outlined in Wooley v. Maynard).
14
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an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner
and with the objective that it is read and communicated to the public.83 Nor
is the Government free to intervene with speech for the purpose of promoting
a message while suppressing another one.
84
Accordingly, the government is prohibited from regulating speech in such
a way that it prefers one viewpoint compared to or at the expense of another
viewpoint.85 Thus, the government cannot argue that communicating a
message on currency is a compelling governmental interest because the
message on U.S. currency is compelled or forced speech in violation of the
First Amendment.8 6 The plaintiffs pointed out that the government's assertion
that the nation's motto on U.S. currency communicates a message to its
citizens and the world was unsupported by facts and neglected to address how
the world communicated prior to 1955, when Congress mandated that the
phrase be printed on all coins and bills. The Government's compelling
interest must strike a balance between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests.88 Nonetheless, the Court in New Doe Child #1 did
not assess any evidence on how the role of the motto on U.S. currency is
disseminated to Americans and to the rest of the world; rather, the analysis
ended in the Court's determination that the plaintiffs were not substantially
burdened.89
More importantly, despite the fact that the Government offered no
83. See Woo ley, 430 U.S. at 714 (reconciling that an individual' right to speak freely
or refrain from speaking is a fundamental right protected by the First Amendment).
84. See Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F.Supp.2d 585, 599 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (holding that a
state compelling an individual to give the state's message is compelled ideological speech
and warrants the highest degree of protection under the First Amendment).
85. Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 605, 622 (1999) (noting that favoritism for or against a religious message violates
both the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
86. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 (holding that the state did not prove that requiring
individuals to carry the state's motto "Live Free or Die" was a compelling governmental
interest as the state's claimed interest was not ideologically neutral).
87. See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 601 (6th Cir. 2018)
(noting that the government's argument that communicating a message is a compelling
interest is contradicted by American history, as the national motto was not consistently
on coins and bills until an act of congress in 1955).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (finding that the compelling interest test
established in the years of federal court decisions is a workable test for finding a balance
between religious liberty and competing governmental interests).
89. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 591 (dismissing the plaintiffs' RFRA claims
because they did not plausibly allege that the government's inscription of "In God We
Trust" on U.S. currency substantially burdened their free exercise rights).
2019]
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evidence regarding how the nation's motto on currency communicates the
country's fundamental political values, the Government does not meet the
compelling governmental interest test under RFRA because it cannot explain
why disseminating any r e 1 i g io u s message is a compelling governmental
interest.90
The Government cannot prove a compelling governmental interest in
communicating a message to the nation and the world.91 In determining
whether a compelling governmental interest exists, a generalized assertion
that there is a compelling interest will not suffice in establishing that there is
indeed a compelling interest.92 Instead, a case-by-case determination using
the relevant facts is necessary for concluding whether a compelling interest
exists.93 Such compelling interests under RFRA in the past have been
protecting the endangered species of the American bald eagle, preventing the
dissemination of heroin, or enforcing a strict grooming policy in a state
prison.94 In New Doe Child #1, the government's alleged compelling interest
was not of the degree recognized in analogous cases in which the court found
90. Susan D. Franck, Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church: Interpreting
RFRA In The Battle Among God, The Government, And The Bankruptcy Code, 81 MINN
L. REv. 981, 991 (1997) (noting that although most circuits do not have a general
consensus on what governmental interests are compelling, the majority of courts
assessing RFRA claims only find compelling governmental interests in regulating health,
safety, national security, and social security).
91. See Adams v. C.I.R., 170 F.3d 173, 181 (3rd Cir. 1999) (holding that the
government's failure to accommodate a taxpayer's religious beliefs and ensure her
payments did not fund the military did not violate RFRA because the collection of taxes
is a compelling interest); see also U.S. v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the government has a compelling interest to protect eagles sufficient to
support the burden imposed by the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act on non-Native
American practitioners of Native American religions).
92. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
431 (2006) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that strict scrutiny requires consideration
of sensitive facts related to each particular claim).
93. See id. (noting that context matters when applying the compelling interest test);
see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) (emphasizing
strict scrutiny's basic purpose to consider relevant differences).
94. See Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1547 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that,
although against the tenants of a prisoner's religion, officials did not violate RFRA by
requiring he cut his hair and denying access to a sweat lodge for safety reasons); see also
U.S. v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that the government had
a compelling interest to protect eagles to support the burden placed on practitioners of
Native American religions who used eagle feathers during worship); U.S. v. Anderson,
854 F.3d 1033, 1033 (2017) (holding that the government had a compelling interest to
prevent the transmittal of heroin allegedly used for religious purposes to non-religious
groups).
16
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that a compelling interest existed.95 The government must demonstrate how
placing the motto on U.S. currency furthers communicating a message to the
country and the world.96 Because the Government cannot assert a compelling
interest for communicating a message on currency for American citizens and
the rest of the world, the Government has failed to meet its burden under
RFRA and should not be permitted to impose the burden on the plaintiffs.
97
C. The Nation's Motto on U.S. Currency Is Not the Least Restrictive
Means by Which the Government Could Achieve Its Interest
In addition to failing to provide evidence to support its assertion that the
Government has a compelling interest in communicating the motto to its
citizens and the world, the Government also failed to establish that it is
pursuing this its compelling interest using the least restrictive means.98 As
Judge Moore stated in her dissent in New Doe Child #1, if the Government's
interest is to convey a message to U.S. citizens and to the rest of the world,
then the phrase "In God We Trust" is not the only phrase that could be used
on currency, and thus the government action is not the least restrictive means
of furthering that interest.99
95. Caleb C. Wolanek et al., Applying Strict Scrutiny: An Empirical Analysis of Free
Exercises Cases, 78 MONT. L. REV. 275, 287 (2017) (discussing that interests are
compelling when of the "highest order," often involving threats to public safety or law
and order); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 546 (1993) (holding that a non- neutral law must survive strict scrutiny and advance
interests of the highest order).
96. See Wolanek, supra note 95 at 288 (noting that it is not enough for a government
to state it has a general interest in its action and a law cannot be compelling of the
"highest order" when it leaves appreciable damage to the unprohibited interest).
97. See Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 82 (2015) (discussing how the compelling
interest test expires when the government cannot prove a compelling interest and
therefore, no inquiry is necessary in determining if the government action was the least
restrictive means).
98. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1289 (noting that when government action is challenged
as not being the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest, its burden is
two-fold: it must support its choice of regulation and refute alternatives offered by the
challenger, but it must do so with evidence from the record); see also Eternal Word
Television Network, Inc. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 818 F.3d
1122, 1158 (1 1th Cir. 2016) (holding that the government must show it lacks other, less
burdensome means of achieving its goal and if a less restrictive option serves its interest
"equally well," it must use that alternative).
99. See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of the U.S, 891 F.3d 578, 601 (6th Cir. 2018)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the government has failed to purport evidence
showing that the motto "In God We Trust" is the only phrase that can communicate the
country's fundamental values and subsequently has not proven that the governmental
2019]
17
Firmand: Paypal or Plastic, Don't Matter The Court Won't Have It: Why the
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019
276 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 27:2
It is clear that the Government has a less restrictive and equally effective
means of disseminating a message about America's fundamental values by
merely using any other phrase.'0 In another Sixth Circuit case, the court
acknowledged that the phrase "In God We Trust" does not have an
exclusively secular meaning.1 1 As such, another phrase that represents
American values with a more secular meaning, such as the phrase, E Pluribus
Unum, would be equally if not more suited to be the phrase inscribed on U.S.
currency, as it has been part of the Great Seal of the United States since
1782.102
The Government did not provide evidence to show how the current motto
reflects American fundamental values or even what those fundamental values
are. 103 Although Christianity is the predominant religion for approximately
70.6 percent of Americans, other main religions, including Judaism, Islam,
Hinduism and Buddhism, encompass millions of American followers.10 4 In
terms of population, today approximately 4.2 million Americans are Jewish,
about 3.3 million Americans are Muslim, and another 82 million are
religiously unaffiliated. 105 This is an enormous shift from the 90 percent of
the population that identified as Christian in the 1950s. 106 At the time RFRA
action is the least restrictive means).
100. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2801-02 (2014)
(discussing the Government's burden in showing that they are pursuing the least
restrictive means).
101. See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 307-
08 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing that because the phrase "In God We Trust" is not
exclusively secular, it does not necessarily mean the phrase fails the test, rather, like the
national anthem and the pledge of allegiance, the phrase is a symbol of a common
identity); see also Gaylor v. U.S., 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
reasonable observer, who was aware of the history of the nation's motto as well as its
context and purpose, would not consider "In God We Trust" on U.S. currency to be an
endorsement of religion).
102. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 601 (assessing the Government's least
restrictive means in furthering their compelling governmental interest (citing GAILLARD
HUNT, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE HISTORY OF THE SEAL OF THE UNITED STATES 7, 41
(1909)).
103. See id. at 602 (assessing the Government's argument that the national motto's
inscription on U.S. currency promotes and disseminates American fundamental political
values).
104. Religion & Public Life, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/
religious-landscape-study/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2018) (noting the breakdown of
predominate religions in America and the corresponding percentages of their followers).
105. See id.
106. See Explore Religious Groups In the US. by tradition, Family and
Denomination, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/
18
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was signed by Congress, church attendance was at the highest levels ever
reported in American history.10 7 By 1960, approximately 63.3 percent of the
U.S. population was attending church weekly but today, only about 23
percent of Americans attend church or other form of worship every week.'0 8
Thus, the current motto, created approximately sixty years ago, does not
reflect the nation's values as they currently stand and consequently does not
communicate to the world, or even to the country, America's fundamental
values. 109
The values of 1956 are not the values of today. For example, in 1956, when
the national motto was placed on currency, at least sixteen states had a ban
on interracial marriage and the American Psychiatric Association included
homosexuality as a mental disorder."0 Accordingly, what were once core
American values have now evolved with time and the Government's
02/how-many-jews-are-there-in-the-united-states/ (last updated October 2, 2013)
(discussing the Jewish population in America); see also Besheer Mohamed, A New
Estimate of the U.S. Muslim Population, PEW RESEARCH CTR (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/20 16/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslim-population/
(discussing the Muslim population in America); see also Religious Landscape Study,
PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (last visited
Mar. 28, 2019) (noting the number of Americans who do not identify as a follower of
any particular religion); see also Frank Newport, Percentage of Christians in US.
Drifting Down, but Still High, GALLUP (Dec. 24, 2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/18
7955/percentage-christians-drifting-down-high.aspx (noting the percentage of Christian
Americans in the 1950s).
107. See Carol Tucker, The 1950s-Powerful Years for Religion, Usc NEWS (June 16,
1997), https://news.usc.edu/25835/The- 1950s-Powerful-Years-for-Religion/ (discussing
how the spike in population in the United States correlated with an increase in church
attendance).
108. See id. (discussing the breakdown of church attendance by religious affiliation);
see also Statista, Church Attendance of Americans 2017, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/245491 /church-attendance-of-americans/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2018)
(discussing the results of surveys regarding church attendance in the United States in
2017).
109. See History of 'In God We Trust,' supra note 30 (discussing that the first
appearance of the nation's motto on U.S. currency was due to a rise in religious
sentiment).
110. See Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 1817 (1967) (holding that the state of
Virginia's ban on interracial marriage violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Dan Bryan, The Gay Bars and Vice
Squads of 1950's Los Angeles, AMERICAN HISTORY USA (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.
americanhistoryusa.com/the-gay-bars-and-vice-squads-of- 1950s-los-angeles/
(discussing the near unanimous view in the psychiatric community that homosexuality
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contention in New Doe Child #1 that the nation's motto is reflective of these
fundamental values ignores that American fundamental values have been
completely overhauled since 1956.111 A different phrase that does not endorse
a religious sentiment would be an alternative that would not substantially
burden plaintiffs' religious exercise. 112 The Government argued, however,
that the national motto is already the least restrictive means in furthering their
governmental interest as it is the only phrase that is the national motto.' 13
This argument does not pass the least restrictive means test because the
phrase "In God We Trust" has only been the national motto since 1956, when
it replaced the unofficial motto, Pluribus Unum.14 A national motto existed
prior to the adoption of "In God We Trust," showing that any phrase can
become the nation's motto and refuting the government's argument that the
only message that is appropriate is this particular phrase. "
5
In New Doe Child #1, the court did not consider whether the Government
was using the least restrictive means to further its interest of communicating
to the world and U.S. citizens America's fundamental values." 6 In fact, the
Government made a blanket statement that their action was the least
restrictive because the motto is a primary way by which the Government
communicates to its citizens and to the rest of the world its fundamental
values on which our Government is founded."t7 The framework under RFRA
111. See John Steele Gordon, The 50 Biggest Changes in the Last 50 Years,
AMERICAN HERITAGE (June/July 2004), https://www.americanheritage.com/content/50-
biggest-changes-last-50-years (discussing the most drastic changes in America in the last
fifty years).
112. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2802 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the least restrictive means must be equally
effective and should not require employees to forfeit the benefits provided to them by
federal law so their employer can continue to subscribe to their religious practices).
113. See New Doe Child #1 v. Cong. of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 601 (6th Cir. 2018)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (illustrating the government's argument).
114. See Sarah Moughty, "In God We Trust" Reaffirmed as National Motto...
Again, FRONTLINE (November 4, 2011), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/in-
god-we-trust-reaffirmed-as-national-motto-again/ (noting that "E Pluribus Unum" was
the national motto before the government elected to replace it with "In God We Trust").
115. See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 301
(6th Cir. 2001) (noting that the federal government adopted the phrase "In God We
Trust" as the national motto in 1956 and was later codified as 36 U.S. § 302).
116. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 591 (holding that the plaintiffs had not
plausibly alleged that the Government inscription of the motto on U.S. currency
substantially burdens their exercise of religion and therefore affirm the dismissal of the
plaintiffs RFRA claim).
117. See id. at 601 (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the government does not put
forth any evidence to support its reasoning that its actions are the least restrictive means
20
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encourages pragmatic considerations for alternative means."8  Here, the
Government has an alternative means of reaching their goal, without
imposing a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious exercise. " 9 Had the
Government communicated what exactly the fundamental American values
being communicated were, there would have undoubtedly been an equivalent
phrase that would not burden the plaintiffs' beliefs but could also
communicate the same values as "In God We Trust."'120  Instead, the
Government presented no such evidence and the court failed to conduct a
thorough analysis of the RFRA factors.12' The court in New Doe Child #1
did not consider whether the Government's action was the least restrictive
means of communicating a message to the world, and consequently did not
find that the Government had alternative and less restrictive means available
to it. 122 The Government does not bear the burden of disproving all possible
alternatives to prove that it is acting in the least restrictive means by
communicating a message to the country and to the world; rather, the
Government must consider at least some alternative means to demonstrate
that they are pursuing the compelling interest pursuant to the standard set
forth under RFRA.123 The most obvious alternative, for the Government to
and therefore permitted under RFRA); see also Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 284
(3rd Cir. 2007) (invoking the Supreme Court's suggestion that the government must
consider and reject other means before concluding that the action taken is the least
restrictive means).
118. See U.S. v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that the court
must make an independent examination of the facts as a whole to ensure the
governmental action does not intrude too much on the free exercise of religion (citing
Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1219 (10th Cir.
2007)).
119. See U.S. v. Epstein, 91 F. Supp. 3d 573, 586 (D.N.J. 2015) (concluding that the
least restrictive means requires the government to show there is no alternative for
achieving the interest, wherefore, imposing a burden on an individual's exercise of
religion is permitted) (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780
(2014)).
120. See New Doe Child #1, 891 F.3d at 601 (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting the
Government failed to show its action was the least restrictive in achieving a compelling
interest and sidestepped the compelling interest test the Government had asserted).
121. See id. at 591 (finding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden establishing
the presence of a substantial burden without assessing the Government's burden).
122. See Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 248 (6th Cir. 2015)
(discussing that no state action that limits protected speech will survive strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment unless it is narrowly tailored to be the least restrictive means
available to serve the compelling governmental interest).
123. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1289 (holding that the government is not required to
rebut a perpetual list of alternatives to support its action, but it is required to support that
its chosen method of action is least restrictive and no alternative would not be less
2019]
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substitute the current motto for another phrase, would surely satisfy the least
restrictive means analysis. 124 At the bare minimum, the government should
be required to prove why an alternative phrase on the U.S. currency would
not be a less restrictive alternative.125  The Government's use of an
alternative, secular phrase would most certainly not impose a burden on those
who do not find the phrase offensive.126 Although whether the Government
acted in the least restrictive means was not analyzed in New Doe Child #1, in
subsequent cases, if the Government cannot prove that they are pursuing an
action in the least restrictive means, then the court must find a RFRA
violation. 127
The Government in New Doe Child #1 did not prove that it had used the
least restrictive means because it did not assess or disprove whether there was
an alternative to placing the phrase "In God We Trust" on U.S. currency.
12
1
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit erred by ending their analysis with the
substantial burden element of RFRA and an analysis of each element is
necessary to decide if a RFRA claim is viable.
129
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
There are a few potential solutions for solving the ambiguity surrounding
RFRA cases. In order for potential plaintiffs to gain clarity on how courts
will decide on claims brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
restrictive).
124. See McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 477 (5th Cir.
2014) (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2571, 2758 (2014))
(holding that the Government fails the least restrictive means test when it fails to provide
evidence proving that a suggested alternative is not viable).
125. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2758 (holding that the government failed the least
restrictive means test under RFRA because it had an alternative to the contraceptive
mandate under the Affordable Care Act).
126. See id. at 2760 (noting that courts analyzing RFRA claims must take into
consideration whether the suggested modification is a burden on nonbeneficiaries and
that consideration should be used in the balancing test of the government's compelling
interest and the option of acting in the least restrictive means of advancing that interest).
127. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing to the two elements of claims brought under RFRA and discussing the
government's burden in establishing it is acting in furtherance of the compelling
governmental interest).
128. See id. at 1079 (noting the Government failed to consider reasonable alternatives
to the use of recycled wastewater).
129. See New Doe Child #1 v. Congress of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 591 (6th Cir. 2018)
(finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated how they would encounter a substantial
burden by carrying currency inscribed with the national motto).
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the courts must be subject to a specific and defined standard for determining
when a burden becomes substantial and by what means the governmental
action serves a compelling interest.130 Without a standard for determining
substantial burdens and compelling governmental standards, courts will
continue to apply subjective standards based on biased views.'3
A rational standard for determining whether a burden has become
substantial is to apply a two-part test.132 To determine whether a substantial
burden exists, the burdened party would have to first sincerely, subjectively
believe they are burdened by the governmental action and second, would
have to show that the burden is objectively substantial.133 A two-part test
would add a safety net against cases where a substantial burden exists but it
would be unreasonable to force the government to act in an alternative way
depending on the reasonableness of the burden.134 An example of such a test
can be found in Katz v. United States, where a two-prong test was established
to determine reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy.135 Such a
130. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (holding that a prison's grooming
policy substantially burdened a Muslim inmate's exercise of religion by preventing him
from growing his beard in accordance with his religion); see also Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 521 (1993) (holding that the plaintiffs
were substantially burdened by the government's implementation of a law preventing
animal sacrifice, which prevented plaintiffs' free exercise of religion); Cf U.S. v.
Anderson, 854 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that the government had a
compelling interest in preventing the dissemination of heroin purportedly used for
religious purposes).
131. See New Doe Child #1,891 F.3d at 591 (dismissing plaintiffs RFRA claims for
not sufficiently establishing that their religious exercise was substantially burdened by
carrying cash inscribed with the national motto); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (finding "Little doubt
that RFRA claims will proliferate, for the Court's expansive notion of corporate
personhood-combined with its other errors in construing RFRA-invites for profit entities
to seek religious-based exemptions from regulations they deem offensive to their faith").
132. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring)
(establishing a two-prong test for determining a person's right to privacy).
133. See id. at 362-63 (White, J. concurring) (discussing that a test of reasonableness
is warranted to determine constitutionality of Fourth Amendment cases).
134. See U.S. v. Girod, 159 F. Supp. 3d 773, 780 (E.D. Ky. 2015) (holding that
compelling the Amish defendant to be photographed in processing procedure at the
prison prior to release would force him to violate his sincerely held religious beliefs); see
also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 521 (holding that ordinance that
prohibited ritual slaughter of animals substantially burdened plaintiffs' free exercise
rights).
135. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 363 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring) (discussing that
generally the level of privacy one expects is based on the place and creating a two-part
test for one's expectation of privacy).
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test when dealing with a term that could have varying definitions from person
to person would be imperative for claims under the RFRA.
The government must also be subject to a clear standard for determining a
compelling interest. 13 6 A compelling governmental interest should be defined
as a measurable interest that is for the betterment of society.'3 7 By adding an
interest measuring requirement, the government will be prevented from
asserting that the government interest is compelling without providing
substantive and measurable support proving so.
Despite Justice Alito's claims in his majority opinion in Hobby Lobby that
the government's burden in proving that they are acting in the least restrictive
means is exceptionally demanding, presently there is no workable test to
determine when the government is pursing the least restrictive means.'38
With claims arising under RFRA, courts should be forced to analyze at least
one alternative means and dispute the effectiveness of the alternative means
before proving that the current government action is the least restrictive.
Lastly, if a suitable test cannot be determined or agreed upon for
determining a substantial burden, compelling governmental interests, and
least restrictive means, then Congress should consider repealing RFRA
altogether. Application of RFRA claims have drastically deviated from the
legislature's intent. " 9 Accordingly, the way courts determine RFRA claims
needs to be assessed to make sure the law is acting in accordance with
Congress' intent.
136. See Franck, supra note 90, at 991 (noting that the RFRA statute does not define
a compelling governmental interest beyond stating it is a concern of the highest order).
137. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
432 (2006) (holding that the government could not ban a religious group's sacramental
use of hallucinogenic tea because it had not shown a compelling interest in preventing
the use ofhoasca); see also U.S. v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10 Cir. 2011) (holding
that the government has a compelling interest to protect birds that represent national
symbols or endangered species).
138. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014) (citing
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (describing the government's task of
demonstrating that it is pursing the governmental action in the least restrictive means).
139. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (holding
that Oregon could deny claimants unemployment compensation benefits for workplace
misconduct for the use of drugs during religious ceremonies); see also Micah
Schwartzman, The New Law ofReligion, Slate (July 3, 2014) https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2014/07/after-hobby-lobby-there-is-only-rfra-and-thats-all-you-need.html
(reviewing the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby as providing more protection for
religion than had ever been provided under the First Amendment).
24




While there remains room for RFRA to be more narrowly defined, recent
case law has demonstrated a trend of moving farther away from the response
to Employment Division v. Smith and towards something entirely new and
uncharted.140  As parameters for validating substantial burdens and
compelling governmental interests remain elusive, RFRA will need to be
refined or repealed.14 1 Without a standard for determining the elements in
RFRA, courts will continue to apply subjective and biased qualifications for
what constitutes a substantial burden and determining compelling
governmental interests. 1
42
Since RFRA's enactment in 1993, it has only been defined by case law
and has not once been revisited by Congress.143 Accordingly, Congress must
revisit the statute and provide clarity for future claims arising under RFRA.
140. See, e.g., Zubikv. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1561 (2016) (vacating judgment and
remanding to the Court of Appeals to consider non-profit employer's challenge to the
mandate to provide its employees with health insurance coverage, including for
contraceptives, pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and that the
government met the religious exemption requirements).
141. See Katha Pollitt, "hy It's Time to Repeal the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, THE NATION (July 30, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-its-time-
repeal-religious- freedom-restoration-act/ (discussing that RFRA is not being applied as
it was designed by Congress).
142. See New Doe Child #1 v. Congress of the U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 591 (finding that
a substantial burden did not exist because the plaintiffs had an option to use alternatives
to transacting in cash and merely preferred using in cash).
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993) (establishing the government's prohibition on
substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion and identifying exceptions).
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